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ABSTRACT
The article analyzes how the Mexican subnational 3 governments responded the COVID-19 outbreak 
during the first stage of the crisis. The response of two subnational governments whose territory is part of 
the largest metropolitan area in the country that has been the focus of the pandemic is presented. We ask 
about the coordination instruments to face COVID-19 between the federal policy and programs with the 
subnational governments and argue that, during the first stage of the management of the COVID-19 crisis 
the institutional and organizational design of the Mexican political-administrative system has had a relevant 
impact on the government’s response, as well in the coordination policies. The article demonstrates that 
in a crisis, coordination instruments do not depend on political parties but consist of a blend of weak and 
suitable articulation of policies of the subnational governments with the federal strategy, as well as the need 
to improve the instruments of collaboration between the various levels of government in the context of a 
healthcare system in transformation.
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RESUMEN
El artículo analiza cómo respondieron los gobiernos subnacionales mexicanos al brote de COVID-19 
durante la primera etapa de la crisis. Se presenta la respuesta de dos gobiernos subnacionales cuyo 
territorio forma parte de la mayor área metropolitana del país que ha sido foco de la pandemia. Nos 
preguntamos acerca de los instrumentos de coordinación para enfrentar el COVID-19 entre la política y los 
programas federales con los gobiernos subnacionales y argumentamos que, durante la primera etapa de la 
gestión de la crisis del COVID-19 el diseño institucional y organizacional del sistema político-administrativo 
mexicano ha tenido un impacto relevante en la respuesta del gobierno, así como en las políticas de 
coordinación. El artículo demuestra que, en una crisis, los instrumentos de coordinación no dependen 
de los partidos políticos, sino que consisten en una combinación de articulación débil y adecuada de las 
políticas de los gobiernos subnacionales con la estrategia federal, así como de la necesidad de mejorar 
los instrumentos de colaboración entre los gobiernos subnacionales en el contexto de un sistema de salud 
en transformación.
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I NTRODUCTION
The first case of COVID-19 in Mexico was diagnosed on February 28, 2020, and two weeks later the 
federal government began its most important strategy against the COVID-19 outbreak on March 13. This 
strategy was known as the “National Campaign for Healthy Distance”, and consisted in a social isolation 
policy, from March 23 to May 30, when the country was still in the second phase of the pandemic (i.e. local 
transmission). The strategy included three central measures: suspension of activities in the education sys-
tem, temporary closure of companies defined as non-essential, and interruption of recreational activities, and 
additional prevention measures related to hygiene and protection were put in place to support vulnerable 
populations. Almost simultaneously, state governments established further actions, including limiting access 
to shopping centers and public markets, authorizing home-delivery services for restaurants, and limiting or 
closing access to cemeteries. This strategy took place in the context of a process of transformation of the 
public sector in Mexico, in which policies have been directed towards austerity in the public sector. In the case 
3 Since Mexico is a federal Republic. Here we use the term subnational governments to refer to the 32 States and Local govern-
ment is used in reference to municipalities.
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of the health sector through the disappearance of the so-called social protection system in health, known as 
“Seguro Popular” converted in the Institute of Health for the Well-being (INSABI).
In a country of more 230,000 deaths one year after the pandemic according with the official information, 
the analysis of the first responses is crucial. The case of México is interesting and has important contributions 
to the analysis of crisis management as well as policies related to the COVID-19 outbreak. Firstly, because 
there are few studies have focused on the role of local and subnational governments versus national strate-
gies; and secondly, due to the paradoxical way the coordination instruments in a fragmented system (Bode 
and Culebro, 2018), the Mexican government confronts the challenge of reducing the impacts of the crisis in 
a framework of multilevel governance.
Methodologically, the article follows the strategy of qualitative case studies (Ragin, 1999; Stake 1995). 
Cases which were selected for their ability to explain the importance of coordination instruments, as well as 
for the complexity and representativeness they have for the Mexican Republic, since they share metropolitan 
areas, industrial corridors, a large population, and the differentiation of political leaderships (Yin, 1994). Mexico 
City and the State of México were chosen for several theoretical and empirical reasons. First, because these 
two cases have been the center of the pandemic governed by different political parties that challenges the idea 
of political affinity to achieve coordination, as well as the interorganizational capacity of the public agencies 
(Pavlovic et al, 2021). The design and urban planning of large metropolis have had a relevant impact on the 
development of the pandemic on different phases of crisis management (Lai et al, 2020; Ribeiro et al, 2020). 
Second, the existence of a centralist path dependence in Mexico that contributes towards a high specialty 
hospital infrastructure (Culebro, Méndez and Cruz, 2019). As is noted by the historical institutionalism, further 
policies would be determined by previous decisions (Moloney and Moloney, 2020). Third, the relevance of the 
theoretical implications to study a metropolitan area in front of a crisis scenario to reduce the impact of the cri-
sis. in a fragmented health system. The complexity and representativeness that both entities have in the Mexi-
can Republic, by sharing metropolitan areas, industrial corridors, a large population, and the differentiation of 
political leaderships gives them a unique interest to study coordination in the face of the challenge situation.
The information was obtained mainly from public documents of the three levels of government, and from 
government sources and databases, among others from Internet portals specialized in COVID-19 of each 
State, and the daily press conferences. The analysis of legislation was relevant for the study of the intuitional 
design of both national and state health systems. We conducted what is called a desk research interested in 
the background and development of historical events (Van Thiel, 2014).
The crisis response to the pandemic has challenged both the governmental capacities, such as the 
structures and resources available to deal with the critical event; as well as legitimacy, or the perception and 
media citizen evaluation of how the government copes with crisis (Christensen and Laegreid, 2020). Due to 
the social pressure towards political actors, there has been a great desire to take impulsive, fast, large, and 
spectacular measures (Boin and Lodge, 2021a), which may not bring the expected benefits. However, due to 
the long term of the COVID-19 crisis, we can differentiate two key moments in its management.
The first phase faced a scenario of uncertainty about the scope and impact of the crisis, some govern-
ments were not prepared or under underestimated the dangerousness of the virus which was compared, for di-
fferent reasons, with a small flu (cf. Rucker and Costa, 2020; Paton, et al., 2020; Renteria and Arellano, 2021). 
The second phase arises once governments have deal with the pandemic and try to learn from the lessons 
extracted and implement the necessary measures to mitigate the impact of the crisis (Boin and Hart, 2020).
In this article we focus on the first phase in which various governments such as the Norwegian, the 
Indian, or the Mexican, adopted similar measures recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO), 
such as isolation, restriction of movement, maintaining an adequate distance between people, among others 
(cfr. Jahagirdar et al., 2020; Christensen and Laegreid, 2020). In the Mexican case the first phase took place 
from February 27, when the first case appeared, until June 1, when the second response phase began; his 
implied to implement coordination efforts in a fragmented health system (Culebro, Méndez and Cruz, 2019) 
at different levels.
As noted, before we argue that a fragmented organizational / institutional design has an impact on crisis 
management, unlike other nations where the central government implemented extraordinary and unusual 
decisions to safeguard citizen well-being, managed to implement a kind of measures and regulations created 
to prevent the spread of the virus (Christensen and Laegreid, 2020). Besides, the use of symbols, such as 
solidarity, empathy, among others, as well as the perspective of collaboration between politicians, scientists, 
citizens, the media, and levels of government were important despite any controversies with local govern-
ments (cfr. Christensen and Laegreid, 2020).
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Throughout this article, the concepts of crisis, crisis management and coordination are used on a regular 
basis to explain the response of local/subnational governments in Mexico. Regarding the first, it is generally 
associated with the concept of disaster, although they depart from different ideas, the disaster occurs when an 
event causes damage people and infrastructure due to natural causes such as earthquakes and floods, or by 
causes attributed to the individual such as terrorist attacks, economic losses, and technology failures (Boin, 
Hart and Kuipers, 2018). Meanwhile, the crisis refers mainly to an event, shared perception, or socio-linguistic 
construct about a latent threat in basic structures, norms, and fundamental values  such as life or health; and 
therefore, it is necessary to act as soon as possible to reduce its impact (Backman and Rhinard, 2017; Boin, 
et al, 2005; Christensen et al, 2016; Matthews, 2012). Crisis management is an essential activity of the gover-
nment to strengthen the resistance of the population, as well as the infrastructure networks (Baubion, 2012). 
Thus, management is seen as the sum of activities aimed at minimizing the impact, not only in the mentioned 
aspects, but also in public institutions (Boin, Kuipers and Overdijk, 2013), so that an appropriate management 
can be the difference between an incident or complete disaster (Boin, Hart and Kuipers, 2018).
In the first part, the concepts of crisis and coordination are reviewed, as well as interactions with crisis 
management and public sector as a model to study the Mexican case. Subsequently, the federal strategy is 
analyzed, so that in the following section the main characteristics of the policies and programs of the subna-
tional governments are exposed, the case of the México City and the State of México. In the fourth section, 
the coordination instruments generated by federal and local strategies are discussed. Finally, in the conclu-
sion section contributions are posed in terms crisis management for COVID-19 and organization theory, more 
specifically the way in which we employ two cases where subnational governments have deployed coordina-
tion instruments and by doing, so we advance our knowledge how coordination operates in a context of crisis 
within a fragmented system. In the next section we will develop the key concepts of the article, in particular 
coordination and its relationship with crisis management and public policies.
I.  CRISIS AND COORDINATION
Coordination in crisis management has been an important issue, either with a different role in each of its 
stages, or to explain some types of crises, such as the transboundary crisis that crosses political and geo-
graphical borders. Transboundary crises demand international collaboration between levels of government 
and the employment of regulatory instruments, becomes a great challenge for the capacities of the State and 
government organizations. Moreover, cooperation and coordination are also relevant when it comes to the 
internal security of each country as in the case of terrorist attacks (Christensen et al., 2015) and floods (Jann 
et al., 2019). In a more interconnected world, the nature and characteristics of crises tend to produce different 
arrangements and instruments for coordination between sectors affected by disasters or emergencies (Blon-
din and Boin, 2020; Olsson, 2015).
The literature on coordination recognizes at least two main dimensions, the first one related to pu-
blic policies and relevant to the solution of complex problems, even those called wicked problems (Peters, 
2018). This dimension emphasizes the problems of integration of public programs for the implementation of 
public policies (Peters, 2018). From this approach, coordination is achieved mainly by hierarchy or through 
networks. The second dimension refers to organizational theory, which has deeply studied the various me-
chanisms of inter- and intra-organizational coordination either from the way of functioning and the context 
in which organizations operate (Mintzberg, 1993; Foss, 2020) or as a form of collaboration derived from the 
specialization of work in organizations (Culebro, 2000; Burton and Obel, 2018).
Fragmentation could become the other side of the coin when talking about coordination related to the 
coherence and integration of public policies and making decisions aimed to solve complex problems (Ceju-
do and Michell, 2017). For wicked problems for instance coordination and collaboration between levels of 
government becomes a precondition for its diagnosis and solution (Christensen et al., 2019). In the case 
of health systems such as Mexico, the problem of fragmentation is even more evident, not only because of 
the characteristics of the health system but also since the recent reforms that have taken place in Mexico in 
latest years. For instance, problems of fragmentation and weak coordination in the implementation of public 
programs related to nutrition in Mexico have been notorious (Delgado and Culebro, 2019); other situations of 
institutional design such as the tension between centralization and decentralization in the response to CO-
VID-19 have also been important (Mattei and del Pino, 2021). Though, it does not happen in the same way 
in the case of interorganizational relationships (Marín-Idárraga and Campos, 2015).
EXPERIENCIAS Y CASOS 105 
Jorge E. Culebro Moreno / Benjamín Méndez Bahena / Pablo Cruz
Coordinación y gestión de crisis. El caso del gobierno federal y dos gobiernos subnacionales en México
GAPP. Nueva Época – N.o 27, noviembre 2021 – ISSN: 1989-8991 – DOI: https://doi.org/10.24965/gapp.i27.10902 – [Págs. 101-114]
Because of the administrative reforms, the importance of coordination, as a process or outcome for the 
public sector has been highlighted in the last decades, not only from the organization analysis (Mintzberg, 
1993) but also for policy analysis and public sector performance (Bouckhaert et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
recent reforms associated with the Post-NPM approach have addressed the status of the coordination instru-
ments to tackle with some fragmentation and atomization problems derived from the NPM reforms (Culebro, 
2008) or those related to the Whole of Government Approach (Christensen and Laegreid, 2011) or Joined 
Up Government (Halligan, 2010). Sometimes through collaboration at the horizontal and vertical levels, or 
through the introduction of new ways of operating between agencies under the approach of performance 
measurement systems. In the context of such reforms, specialization of the public agencies appears to be 
one of the main causes of the absence of coordination.
As a result of these reforms, the specialization of public agencies has led to a debate about the ne-
cessary balances in the functioning and operation of the public sector, the first of these being related to the 
tension between the necessary autonomy of the agencies with purpose. unique and where appropriate with 
a regulatory function with the indispensable control; The second of the debates has brought the discussion 
around two forces, on the one hand centralizing efforts and on the other decentralization; In all these debates, 
coordination plays a fundamental role (Peters and Savolie, 1996, Christensen and Laegreid, 2006).
These potential tensions have come to affect the coordination processes between specific sectors such as 
food safety coordination. as a form of interorganizational coordination characterized by the establishment of ex-
change of information and rules in decision processes. A first form of coordination lies in the hierarchy with formal 
authority through planning instruments, while coordination through networks involves sharing information and is 
generally more flexible and horizontal. (Lie, 2011) Although, different forms of coordination can be established, 
in our case we use it as specific form of collaboration to align objectives and goals within public sector, aimed at 
strengthening greater coherence and reduce divergences between policies (Boukhaert and Peters, 2010),
During crisis management the significance of coordination acquires a different dimension and implica-
tions for governance (Christensen, 2016). The output of such interest lies on the fact that issues such as 
legitimacy and leadership have become essential to understand the policy responses for many governments, 
either to analyze the effects of health policies, or to understand the role of the authorities and the political 
context in the effectiveness of policies aimed at reducing the impact of the crisis. For instance, it has been 
noted that not only the lack of specialized resources, but also the absence of coordination instruments plays 
a key role in the emergencies such as those related with the current health crisis (Fannelly et al., 2020).
When it comes to crisis management, coordination instruments take on different roles depending on the 
type of crisis in question, be it in the case of disasters and responses in emergency situations. In these situa-
tions, some of the coordination mechanisms tend to be much more flexible even though in normal situations 
they may even be more formal and bureaucratic. Coordination, in a crisis context, refers to vertical and ho-
rizontal cooperation between various actors and organizations, to generate a coordinated behavior capable 
of effectively implementing the policies or decisions designed to face a critical event, despite the presence of 
behaviors and routine practices in organizations (cfr. Boin, Hart and Kuipers, 2018).
As a government action, crisis management plays an essential role in promoting the resilience of popu-
lations and critical infrastructure networks (Baubion, 2012). It can be defined as the sum of activities aimed at 
minimizing the impact of the crisis in terms of damage to the population, the infrastructure, or public institutions 
(Boin, Kuipers, and Overdijk, 2013). This type of management has a direct effect on citizens’ lives and social 
welfare, and when threats and vulnerabilities are not properly evaluated and addressed, a crisis will surely 
follow (Boin et al., 2005); moreover, it can save lives, protect infrastructure, and restore confidence in public 
institutions (Boin, Kuipers, and Overdijk, 2013). Crisis management effectiveness can be assessed based 
on ten executive tasks: early recognition; sense making; making critical decisions; orchestrating vertical and 
horizontal coordination; coupling and decoupling; meaning making; communication; rendering accountability; 
learning, and enhancing resilience (Boin, Kuipers, and Overdijk, 2013). Currently, the discussion focuses on a 
special type of crisis: the progressive crisis. Its effects are more devastating than those of other types of crises 
because, although they have been acknowledged for a certain length of time, no consequential actions have 
been taken, and they quickly transcend physical or administrative boundaries. Their potential harm is especia-
lly difficult to identify, they can be perceived as alien when first detected, and they cannot be effectively addres-
sed using regular approaches, which challenges the governance model (Boin, 2020; Boin and Lodge, 2019).
Additionally, crisis management involves a diversity of actors from the private, public, or citizen sectors, 
with different interests, priorities, logics, and values  (Boin, Kuipers and Overdijk, 2013). Many factors can affect 
the outcome of crisis management (Boin, Kuipers, and Overdijk, 2013), but coordination and cooperation is-
EXPERIENCIAS Y CASOS 106 
Jorge E. Culebro Moreno / Benjamín Méndez Bahena / Pablo Cruz
Coordinación y gestión de crisis. El caso del gobierno federal y dos gobiernos subnacionales en México
GAPP. Nueva Época – N.o 27, noviembre 2021 – ISSN: 1989-8991 – DOI: https://doi.org/10.24965/gapp.i27.10902 – [Págs. 101-114]
sues are at the front line, especially when the crisis crosses borders of different kinds as the absence of goal 
achievement. Coordination involves horizontal and vertical joint actions involving multiple actors, organiza-
tions, and levels of government, as well as different policies that could be interacting for the first time. Although 
cooperation is identified as a major challenge for crisis management, it is also deemed as the essential solu-
tion to crises (Christensen et al., 2016; Boin, Kuipers and Overdijk, 2013). Coordination in the context of crisis 
management takes two forms; the first is structural-instrumental, and it refers to both the vertical relationship, 
i.e., hierarchical relations, and the horizontal relationship, which consists of alternative networks made by of 
same-level actors. In its cultural sense, coordination refers to the promotion of a cooperative culture (Christen-
sen et al., 2007). Next, we will analyze the first phase of the policies and programs of the federal response to 
COVID-19, to later study the coordination instruments as reaction of the two states in Mexico.
II.  COVID-19 CRISIS MANAGEMENT. THE FEDERAL STRATATEGY
A fundamental feature of Mexico’s health services is their high degree of fragmentation, expressed in the 
presence of various federal agencies responsible for serving different segments of the population. At the sub-
national level, the fragmentation is greater. Since the 1997 decentralizing reform, the 32 entities have their 
own health agencies with their corresponding hospital systems where coverage is provided to both formal 
workers and those who are not in any federal social security institution (Culebro and Castro, 2017).
Organizationally, there are three levels of care –figure 1–. The first level, composed by Family Medicine 
Units, Health Centers and Family Clinics attends 80 % of basic health conditions. In the second are the general, 
regional, integral, community, pediatric, obstetric child hospitals, as well as the federal hospitals located in Mexico 
City as referents for the whole country. An expression of the Mexican political system is the great centralization of 
the country’s health infrastructure in Mexico City, linked to its status as the capital and head of the national urban 
system. Fragmentation is revealed in the co-existence of hospitals from two levels of government. At the federal 
level, there are hospital facilities of national public sector agencies in the City of México. At the subnational level 
of government, in Mexico City health services are provided through the Ministry of Health, in simultaneous com-
petence with federal institutions –figure 2–; while in the State of Mexico it is done through the Ministry of Health of 
the State of Mexico and the Institute of Social Security of the State of Mexico (SSCDMX, 2017). At the regulatory 
level, the National Health System is composed of the agencies of the Federal public administration and subnatio-
nal governments together with the individuals and companies of the social and private sectors that provide health 
services. At the subnational level, the state governments are also the health authorities. (DOF, 1984, Art. 5).
Figure 1. Agencies of the public sector at the federal and subnational level
Source: Culebro, Mendez y Cruz (2019).
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Figure 2. The health system of Mexico City
Source: Culebro, Mendez y Cruz (2019).
The Mexican health system is characterized by its fragmentation and inequality, basically it consists of 
three main dimensions: (1) a social insurance for workers in formal economy, this includes governmental em-
ployees, armed forces and employees for state owned companies, (2) public assistance services provided by 
INSABI and (3) a private sector; in addition, each federal entity has its own public health system.
Preparedness COVID-19 pandemic began in January 2020 with two main actions: increasing the insta-
lled hospital capacity and restricting activities to reduce the presence of people in the public space. From the 
epidemiological perspective, at least three phases have been developed in Mexico. The first infected patient 
was identified on February 28. On March 13, a three-stage management strategy began: generalized confi-
nement, opening guided by an epidemiological traffic light, and vaccination. Hospital capacity was increased 
as Mexico moved into the second phase.
The first phase called the “National Campaign for Healthy Distance” was implemented officially from 
March 23 to May 30. It consisted in a set of preventive measures presented as mandatory, yet not coercive: 
individual rights were preserved and no state of exception or curfew affecting national residents or travelers in 
the country was decreed. Its purposes were to mitigate transmission, especially among the most vulnerable 
people, and to reduce the number of inpatients to guarantee access to health care in severe cases (DOF, 
March 24, 2020). The first infected patient was identified on February 28; on March 13, when the number of 
cases increased from 4 to 12, actions were intensified.
Restricted activities were a) Adults over 65 years of age and people at risk of developing a serious ill-
ness and/or dying as a consequence must avoid attending workplaces, public spaces, and other crowded 
venues...; b) School activities are suspended at all levels...; c) Temporarily suspend public, social, and private 
sector activities involving physical concentration, transit, or movement of people... (DOF, March 24, 2020).
These measures can be classified in three groups. The first group includes the suspension of activities 
in schools, public and private universities, and research centers for 10 weeks, from March 20 to May 30, to 
enable social distancing among 37.8 million students and teachers from all educational levels. Three subna-
tional governments (Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Yucatán) suspended activities four days in advance, on March 
17. Concerning the official calendar, the two weeks of Easter holidays were moved earlier and the complete 
suspension period was announced (SEP, 2020).
The second group refers to the temporary suspension of business activities (DOF, March 24, 2020). 
Approximately 6 million private companies employing more than 30 million employees stood down (INEGI, 
2020). Shortly thereafter, measures became slightly more rigid, restricting the number of people inside super-
markets or allowing only pick-up meals in restaurants. The third group, which includes leisure activities, invol-
ved the cancellation of concerts, traditional religious festivities, mass celebrations in churches, and admission 
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to movie theaters and soccer games, as well as access to sports stadiums, public parks, emblematic public 
squares, and pedestrian streets. The government’s invitation was summed up by the phrase “stay at home”.
Activities associated with the health sector, citizen security, the national guard, the army, and the navy 
were considered essential by the federal government. Security corporations continued carrying out their 
usual activities, appealing to persuasion to decrease the presence of people in public spaces and reduce 
the speed with which the virus spread, with the final goal of preventing the saturation of hospital facilities. In 
contrast, different countries such as Spain, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, El Salva-
dor, Paraguay, Peru, and Puerto Rico resorted to different types of individual rights suspensions, states of 
exception, curfews, or complete lockdowns.
The capacity of the national health sector was increased by means of hospital reconversion (Secretaría 
de Salud, 2020b), purchase of specialized equipment, and coordination among federal health institutions 
and subnational organizations with the armed forces (SEDENA, SEMAR) and the hospital network opera-
ted by PEMEX, Mexico’s public oil company. An agreement with two national private hospital associations 
committed to pay for attention to patients not infected by COVID-19, which made it possible to increase the 
capacity of government hospitals to admit patients with COVID-19. Hospital capacity was also increased 
by two temporary hospitals installed in Mexico City, supported by business groups and advice from public 
universities. The federal government attempts to deal with the issue transparently by relying on groups of 
specialist physicians and researchers from public institutions, who created a statistical prediction model, and 
the COVID-19 MEXICO database was updated daily. Health authorities visited companies to ascertain the 
temporary suspension of activities.
As of May 30, a federal decree (DOF, May 14, 2020) established guidelines including a traffic light sys-
tem for subnational government agencies, as health authorities, to take on the reopening process toward the 
“new normality”. The federal government committed to continue providing detailed information and projected 
scenarios. When this was announced, on May 20, urban mobility increased gradually in some cities as a 
result of the increase in individual economic activities and authorizations granted by subnational or muni-
cipal governments, despite that the National Campaign for Healthy Distance was not yet completed. While 
discussing it with subnational governments, as health authorities, if it was agreed that each government will 
calculate by color. State traffic lights have been agreed that may increase protection measures, regarding the 
federal traffic light.
These measures removed close to 80 million people from public space, equivalent to two thirds of the 
total national population during the first 3 months. This percentage was like that achieved by countries whose 
police restricted citizen mobility, in a country where 56.2 % of the population is involved in informal economy 
activities (INEGI, 2020). To facilitate health care, a policy by the government established the obligation to 
receive patients in any of the federal government hospital facilities, which broke the historical exclusion by 
entitlement in each of them. In what follows the response of the subnational strategy is presented aimed at 
analyzing the coordination instruments with the federal government.
III.  THE RESPONSE OF THE SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
From a more general level, the global health system comprises the constellation of actors (individuals 
and / or organizations) aimed at promoting, restoring, and maintaining health, as well as the connected laws 
that limit behavior, restrict activity from the community level, national or global, and that also includes gover-
nmental, intergovernmental, private for-profit and social organizations (Szlezak, et al., 2010). For the WHO, 
meanwhile, health systems are made up of various blocks among which are, (i) provision of services, (ii) 
health personnel, (iii) health information systems, (iv) access to medicines essentials, (v) financing and (vi) 
leadership / governance (WHO, 2010). At a global or national level, health systems are undergoing transfor-
mation and depend to a great extent on the historical trajectories of the countries, as well as on the adminis-
trative political context in which they are located. In this way, subnational health systems in Mexico are part of 
a set of institutions characterized not only by their fragmentation both horizontally and vertically, but also by 
their great inequality between regions and sectors (Bode and Culebro; 2018). At the subnational level, health 
systems replicate, on the one hand, the federal scheme, and on the other, they are capable to design their 
own organizational schemes. The health system of the subnational governments in Mexico is part of a much 
more complex health system that was undergoing transformation at the time of the crisis. In Mexico City, the 
Secretary of Health of Mexico City is responsible for planning, organizing, operating, controlling, and evalua-
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ting the Health System, as well as for organizing and executing programs and actions for health regulation 
and control. in matters of local health..., whose coordination oversees the Major of the Government of Mexico 
City, both the administrative units and the hospitals, clinics and health centers While the State of Mexico, is 
the Secretariat of Health del Estado de México is in charge of health in the State, although the provision of 
health services is the responsibility of a decentralized body, the Instituto de Health of the State of Mexico. In 
this way, the two health systems become different in terms of their organization, but similar in their relations-
hip with the federal health system.
In Mexico City, the country’s capital, coordination mechanisms involving the citizenry were implemented 
so that a patient could dial 911 and be assigned a hospital bed in any medical unit. The Head of Government, 
in coordination with the Secretariat of Health, was responsible for directing actions to address the crisis in 
Mexico City (Sedesa). The capital’s health care system is in better shape than in other states, although coor-
dination among its agencies is fraught with problems (Culebro et al., 2019). Municipal governments adopted 
secondary measures to support the strategy. In preparation for the return to activities a gradual plan toward 
the new normality was issued in Mexico City (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México, 2020).
At the beginning of the crisis, Mexico City’s Head of Government and State of Mexico’s Governor agreed 
share hospitals and work in coordination to facilitate the admission of patients to the nearest hospital or the 
one with availability during the first wave, regardless of the residence entity. For instance, in Mexico City, 
approximately 30 % of those hospitalized were residents of a municipality in the state of Mexico. These two 
subnational governments administer the metropolitan area in the Valley of Mexico, home to 20 million people 
and the place where the largest number of contagious cases was registered at the national level. An outcome 
of this coordination was the construction of two temporary hospitals.
In the State of Mexico, governmental decisions were focused on four aspects: closure of commercial 
venues, mandatory use of face masks, supervision of activities, and creation of regulations. Due to space 
restrictions, we will refer to the first two only. On March 22, the government began to close its modules 
and offices; however, citizens’ procedures were unaffected, since penalties were waived, and the validity of 
driver’s licenses was overridden for the rest of the month and until April 20 4.
This mandatory closure included different public spaces such as libraries, museums, and day-care cen-
ters for children and the elderly, among others, but also private businesses such as shopping centers, bars, 
nightclubs, and other non-priority establishments, that is, businesses whose products or services were not 
of immediate need (Jacinto, 2020). To ensure compliance with the measure, the government implemented 
special operations to temporarily close a number of public, private, and social sector agencies 5, and imposed 
fines and penalties to companies that failed to comply with the mandate (Navarro, 2020). However, initially, 
these operations were limited to the control of access to supermarkets and street markets by restricting entry 
to one out-of-risk person per family wearing a face mask and using antibacterial gel. As an additional preven-
tive measure, on April 8, the government encouraged people to wear face masks when they went outside 6. 
When this measure was approved, on April 21, it was established as mandatory once the third phase of the 
epidemic was declared at the federal level. People would be required to use face masks when leaving their 
home and when using public transportation (Navarro, 2020), which would reduce its operating capacity by 
50 % (GEM, 2020). Despite the coordination measures and actions, the State of Mexico governor was a se-
condary actor.
In this first stage of COVID-19 crisis management, vertical and horizontal coordination, as well as the be-
havior of the two subnational governments was relevant. Due to partisan affinity with the federal government 
in Mexico City, the ruler not only adopted the federal discourse and measures, but also promoted federal 
policies, although later she had some discrepancies with the federal approach. In the state of Mexico, an 
opposition party rules the State, and the governor assumed the federal discourse and strategy.
An interesting phase began on June 1, when the national decree ratifying the federal hierarchy establis-
hed by the General Health Law was signed, establishing the National Campaign for Healthy Distance. From 
that moment on, based on federal-level information, the traffic light model prediction and logistic support, 
each of the 32 subnational governments, including the City of Mexico and the State of México determined the 
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CONCLUSIONS
The development of coordination instruments in the health system in Mexico has become a story like a 
pendulum that goes from centralization to decentralization of functions within a design that has generated con-
flicts between the different levels of government, and above all in public health areas (Nigenda et al., 2015). 
On the one hand, the article complements studies on coordination in the first responses that countries have 
faced to reduce the impact of the crisis in multilevel governments (Mattei and Del Pino, 2021); and on the other, 
the importance of administrative capacity and leadership of the authority to balance the first decisions with the 
instruments of governance and legitimacy during a health crisis (Christensen and Laegreid, 2020).
Analysis was developed with the use of crisis management approach that highlighted the role of the go-
vernment in the first phase of the response. Thus, by combining crisis management approach with perspec-
tives on coordination the study shows the role of subnational governments in dealing with crisis. The study 
also reveals the potential of crisis management and organization theory approaches to study health policies 
(Bode and Culebro, 2018) and those related to pandemic crisis, in which vertical and horizontal coordination 
co-exist in different political systems, either in comparative studies or at subnational level (Liu et al., 2021).
In general terms, despite an eroded health system and their fragmentation, as of May 30, the authorities 
were aimed at reducing the impact of the crisis. Even though there was a great effort to generate coordination 
instruments as strategies for crisis management, coordination was still weak in a context of transformation of 
the health system in Mexico and austerity policies at the federal level. In this first stage, the centralism that 
has characterized the Mexican system allowed the federal government to operate a strategy that was adop-
ted by subnational governments. It was a coordination through a vertical hierarchy that achieved compliance 
close to 85 % 7. Even though coordination difficulties may arise in later stages.
The COVID-19 epidemic hit the country two months after its outbreak in other countries; therefore, it was 
possible to prepare in advance through different measures. Among other things, the collapse of the hospital 
network was prevented during this first stages, though later the percentage of available space in hospitals 
reduced dramatically. Once the reopening phase was announced there were 14,583 COVID-19 patient care 
beds available and 65 % care beds equipped with a ventilator; the official number of positive cases was 
81,400 –active 16,315– and 9,044 people had died (Comunicado Técnico Diario, 2020). One form of coordi-
nation was through patient care independent of their affiliation through the necessary financial adjustments. 
This situation was repeated in the hospitals of 24 States, which in February 2020 agreed to sign an agree-
ment for INSABI to be responsible for hiring new health personnel, medicines, assuming responsibility for 
the administration and provision of health services 8. These actions allowed us to glimpse the possibilities of 
creating a Unified Health System of a public, universal and free (Laurell, 2020), opening the debate on the 
areas in decentralization processes (Falleti, 2010; Tulchin, 2012) its efficiency (Gallego, 2016) and political 
implications (Aalen and Muriaas, 2017; Simonet, 2016) and the processes of recentralization of functions 
under various forms (Riedl and Dickovick, 2014; Dickovick and Eaton, 2013).
The article contributes to the study of the first responses to face the COVID-19 crisis. In the field of litera-
ture on organization theory, the Mexican experience suggests that despite political and ideological considera-
tions, organizations develop their own coordination mechanisms in the face of dynamic and complex contexts 
(Mintzberg, 1993; Foss, 2020); in some cases, as part of previous interactions as in the case of the metropoli-
tan area of the Valley of Mexico, but also as a form of adaptation and learning from the environment (Levit and 
March, 1988). One way of observing this issue is to reflect about the nature of coordination to face a crisis, for 
example by including different coordination instruments depending on the stages of the crisis. Under the new 
institutionalism approach the article highlights the importance of the features of the political-administrative 
system in Mexico for the first responses of the federal government, if these responses influence subsequent 
policies (Bode and Culebro, 2018). Similar to the pragmatic approach in crisis management (Boin and Lodge, 
2021b) the federal and the subnational governments in México did not impose severe measures that may 
affect severely mobility or the use of armed forces.
Crisis management and its strategic tasks, undertaken by organizations at different government levels, 
present differences, but also similarities. Among the similarities, the use of vertical coordination was obser-
ved. The relationships between the federal and subnational governments and between the latter and local 
7 See, https://www.jornada.com.mx/2020/04/16/politica/007n3pol
8 See, https://www.jornada.com.mx/2020/02/12/politica/004n1pol
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governments suggest the presence of a generally accepted hierarchy. The dichotomy between control and 
autonomy in vertical levels seemed to play an important role, as long as, subnational governments were able 
to manage their own policies. Particularly, when it comes a weak coordination.
On the other hand, communications and sensemaking highlighted a remarkable difference: in this re-
gard, the Federal government and the Mexico City governments played more significant roles compared to 
the State of Mexico government. Other differences and similarities are due to organizational and institutional 
aspects and crisis management approaches, but further analysis in this regard will be necessary as this hu-
man catastrophe continues unfolding.
The crisis management approach was found to be useful in understanding coordination mechanisms, 
especially in the context of a progressive crisis whose subsequent stages will have a deep impact on econo-
mic and social life besides the health-related matters. The cases presented point out that despite having a 
fragmented health system and a context where sub-national governments come from different political par-
ties, including those opposed to the federal one, coordination can be generated by means of the creation of 
adequate meaning, driven daily by the federal government; the political will for cooperation due to the sharing 
of political borders in a megalopolis; and the passivity or inactivity of a political leadership.
The article shows on the one hand that coordination among different levels of government do not depend 
on political affinities but consist of a blend of weak and suitable articulation of policies of the subnational go-
vernments; an on the other the need to improve the instruments of collaboration between the various levels 
of government in the context of a healthcare system in transformation.
Most of the government’s responses sought to create vertical and horizontal coordination instruments, at 
least for the metropolitan area of Mexico City. Although the institutional design of the political administrative 
system influences the responses of governments at different levels, the dilemma is, on the one hand, to find 
strategies that reward adequate coordination in fragmented and highly unequal health systems, and on the 
other hand, to resolve the tensions that can occur transversally with other areas such as the economy and 
employment, among others. The article contributes to the study of multilevel governance in metropolitan 
areas (Schurgelies and Baines, 2016) by assessing coordination problems in health institutions, managed 
simultaneously with problems of transportation, employment, marginalization, among others.
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